In the philosophy of language, the distinction between sense and reference was an innovation or ‘significance’, but rendered by Frege’s translators as ‘reference ‘, ‘referent’, ‘Meaning’, ‘nominatum’, etc. Frege introduced the notion of “sense” ( German: Sinn) to accommodate difficulties in his early theory of meaning. On Sense and Reference. Gottlob Frege. Equality* gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation. Phil Language. Basic idea: phrases (like definite descriptions) can have different senses even when they have the same reference (or “nominatum”). 1. Sense.
|Published (Last):||15 July 2009|
|PDF File Size:||14.94 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||2.68 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
The Varieties of Reference. Frege says first that “Such a sentence sennse a thought”, by which he means a certain “objective content, which is capable of being the common property of several thinkers”.
Sign in to use this feature. Aspects of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind.
Index of language articles. Therefore, the thought corresponding to each sentence cannot be its reference, but something else, which Frege called its sense. Pylyshyn – – Cognition 9 2: There are places in Nominatuk writings that he uses ” Bedeutung ” with its ordinary meaning of “meaning”, but it is mostly a technical term for him, and the closest technical term in current philosophical usage is probably “reference”.
Over the next several pargaraphs pp. Sense and Reference of Predicates: Edit rating Delete rating. I’ll write free-form comments when assessing students.
On sense and nominatum
As noted above, translators of Frege have rendered the German Bedeutung in various ways. Frege introduced the notion of “sense” German: Frege does not mention this extension of the point here but does so, again, in other places. But then how can the former be informative and the latter a mere instance of the law of self-identity? However, Saul Kripke argued compellingly against the descriptivist freve.
Gottlob Frege, On sense and nominatum – PhilPapers
nmoinatum Does that seem right? This page was last edited on 18 Decemberat What lies behind this discussion is the role of truth-functional connectives in formal logic.
Yet the sentence ‘Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep’ obviously has a sense, even though ‘Odysseus’ has no reference. The sentences “Hesperus is a planet” and “Phosphorous is a planet” also have different “cognitive values” in German ” Erkenntniswert “, literally: The sense of a name is a linguistic feature of it, one anyone who understands the name must know.
Sense and reference
Frege begins by mentioning a puzzle about identity statements, such as “Hesperus the evening star is the same thing as Phosphorous the morning star “. For the watchmaker, see Sinn watchmaker.
Sinn to accommodate difficulties in his early theory of meaning. University of Michigan Press. I’ll write free-form comments when assessing students Remove points from nominathm Don’t post Outcomes results to Learning Mastery Gradebook Use this rubric for assignment grading Hide score total for assessment results Cancel Create Rubric. Michael De Medeiros – – Weigl Publishers.
Frege supposed that some parts of speech are complete by themselves, and are analogous to the arguments of a mathematical functionbut that other parts are incomplete, and contain an empty place, by analogy with the function itself.
Frege then argues that the thought “contained” in a sentence cannot be its reference. Columbia University Press, According to Kripke,  proper names are rigid designators which designate the same object in every possible world. Aspects of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind categorize this paper. Only when the empty place is filled by a proper name does the reference of the completed sentence — its truth value — appear. Evans further developed this line, arguing that a sense without a referent was not possible.
To what extent does the argument show that senses are not only not ideas but are not subjective at all? Use this rubric for assignment grading.
He notes that the mere difference of shape spelling, pronunciation, whatever between “Hesperus” and “Phosphorous” cannot be what accounts for the difference in cognitive value that we are trying to explain.
It is not so easy to say what the sense of the name is, and Frege does not seem to tell us very much about what it is.
The larger point at issue here, though, is whether sense is subjective. Second, sentences that contain proper names with no reference cannot have a truth value at all. This criterion is linked to a Learning Outcome Description of criterion.
Thus, if one says, “Lois said that Superman can fly”, then one is talking about the sense of Lois’s remarks, as is clear from the fact that it is one thing to say that Superman can fly and another to say that Clark can fly.
Bell’, Analysis xense pp.